

60 Years of Marine Nuclear Power: 1955 - 2015

U. S. NAVAL DISPATCH
5ND-GEN-1007

FROM: USS NAUTILUS SSN 571	CLASSIFICATION: UNCL	PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE
ACTION: COMSUBLANT		
INFO:		

NJOE DE NWCL
 -T-YZZF
 -R-171601Z -FM NWCL -TO YZZF CR ¹/₂ BT

UNDERWAY ~~146R~~ ON NUCLEAR POWER BT....

TOP / 1133R WU/ELT
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5ND-PFPO-1007

Peter Lobner
 August 2015

Foreword

This rather lengthy presentation is my attempt to tell a complex story, starting from the early origins of the U.S. Navy's interest in marine nuclear propulsion in 1939, resetting the clock on 17 January 1955 with the world's first "underway on nuclear power" by the *USS Nautilus*, and then tracing the development and exploitation of nuclear propulsion over the next 60 years in a remarkable variety of military and civilian vessels created by eight nations.

I acknowledge the great amount of work done by others who have posted information on the internet on international marine nuclear propulsion programs, naval and civilian nuclear vessels and naval weapons systems. My presentation contains a great deal of graphics from many internet sources. Throughout the presentation, I have made an effort to identify all of the sources for these graphics.

If you have any comments or wish to identify errors in this presentation, please send me an e-mail to: PL31416@cox.net.

I hope you find this presentation informative, useful, and different from any other single document on this subject.

Best regards,

Peter Lobner
August 2015

60 Years of Marine Nuclear Power: 1955 – 2015

Organization of this presentation

- Part 1: Introduction
- Part 2: United States
- Part 3: Former Soviet Union & Russia
- Part 4: Other Nuclear Marine Nations
 - UK, France, China, Germany, Japan & India
 - Other nations with an interest in marine nuclear power technology: Brazil, Italy, Canada, Australia, North Korea, Israel, Pakistan & Iran
- Part 5: Arctic Operations

60 Years of Marine Nuclear Power: 1955 – 2015

Part 1: Introduction

Peter Lobner
August 2015

Part 1: Introduction

- Quick look: Then and now
- State-of-the-art in 1955
- Marine nuclear propulsion system basics
- Timeline
 - Timeline highlights
 - Decade-by-decade
- Effects of nuclear weapons and missile treaties & conventions on the composition of naval nuclear fleets
- Prospects for 2015 - 2030

Quick look:
then and now

17 Jan 1955: *USS Nautilus* (SSN-571) made the first voyage of a nuclear-powered vessel


- Capt. Eugene P. Wilkinson was the first commanding officer of the *Nautilus* on that historic voyage, which was made from the U.S. Navy submarine base at New London, CT.
- The famous message, “UNDERWAY ON NUCLEAR POWER,” was sent by flashing light signal to Commander Submarine Forces Atlantic.
- *Nautilus* was built by Electric Boat (a division of General Dynamics), Groton, CT.
- The reactor was a 70 MWt S2W pressurized water reactor (PWR) built by Westinghouse Electric Company.
- This was the start of a revolution in marine propulsion and naval technology that is continuing today.



Capt. Eugene P. Wilkinson & *Nautilus*

Source: U.S. Navy

60 years of marine nuclear propulsion programs



The world's marine nuclear fleets

Estimated total of 174 operating nuclear-powered vessels as of mid-2015

	Nuclear submarines				Nuclear surface ships		Country totals
	Attack sub (SSN)	Strategic missile sub (SSBN)	Cruise missile sub (SSGN)	Other special nuc subs	Naval surface combatants	Civilian surface vessels	
	54	14	4	2 MTS	10 CVN	0	84
	19	13	8	9	1 CGN	7	57
	7	4	0	0	0	0	11
	6	3	0	0	0	0	9
	6	4	0	0	1 CVN	0	11
	1 (leased)	1	0	0	0	0	2


CVN = Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; CGN = Nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser MTS = Moored Training Ship

State-of-the-art in 1955

State-of-the-art in 1955


Submarine hull design

- WWII German Type XXI “Elektroboat” set the standard for post-war hydrodynamic hull design and underwater performance
 - Faster speed submerged (17.2 kts) than when running on the surface (15.7 kts)
 - Very large battery capacity; capable of long submerged endurance



Source: www.uboataces.com

- US Navy implemented the Greater Underwater Propulsion Power Program (GUPPY) program to improve WWII-era diesel submarines.
 - Key GUPPY features included removing the deck guns, streamlining the outer hull, replacing the conning tower with a sail, installing new propellers optimized for submerged operations, installing a snorkel mast and more air conditioning, and doubling the battery capacity.
 - USS Tang (SS-563) and USS Darter (SS-576) were the first new U.S. conventional submarines designed under the GUPPY program. Tang was commissioned in October 1951, and Darter in October 1956.
 - Their cleaner hull form is similar to the early U.S. nuclear submarines: Nautilus, Seawolf, Triton, and Skate-class



Source: www.shipbucket.com

USS Albacore (AGSS-569)

Revolutionary hull design




Source: www.princeton.edu

Class	# in Class	Length	Beam	Displacement (tons)	Engine	Shaft hp	Max speed	Years delivered	Years in service
Albacore	1	62.1 m (204 ft)	8.2 m (27 ft)	1240 (surf), 1540 (sub)	2 x GM 16-338 pancake diesels, 1 x electric motor	7,500	33 kts	Dec 1953	Dec 53 – Dec 72


- Albacore's advanced hull form was the result of a 1949 study by U.S. Navy Bureau of Ships (BuShips) and subsequent tests conducted by David Taylor Model Basin, Carderock, MD.
- Key characteristics: teardrop-shaped hull & single screw, which were incorporated immediately into the Skipjack-class SSN and all subsequent classes of U.S. nuclear subs. Also introduced HY-80 high-strength steel hull, which was the U.S. standard through the Los Angeles-class SSN.
- Construction authorized Nov 1950; built at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard; launched in Aug 1953.
- Tested various control surface and propeller configurations, including dorsal rudder on the sail, X-configured stern planes, contra-rotating propellers, and deployable speed brakes.

USS Albacore (AGSS-568)

Initial configuration: aft control surfaces




2nd configuration: control surfaces forward of prop




X-tail



X-tail, with contra-rotating propellers



X-tail, with moderate separation between contra-props



Above: dorsal rudder on aft edge of the sail

Below: final X-tail configuration



State-of-the-art in 1955

Submarine weaponry

- Various WWII-era torpedoes
 - Mk 14, 21" (533 mm) straight-running torpedo
 - Methanol fuel, 643 lb warhead, range: 4,500 yards @ 46 kts; 9,000 yards @ 31 kts
 - Service dates: 1931 – 1980
 - Mk 16, 21" (533 mm) straight or pattern-running torpedo
 - Concentrated hydrogen peroxide (Navol) fuel, 746 lb warhead, range: 11,000 – 13,700 yards @ 46 kts
 - Service dates: 1946 – 1975
 - Mk 27 Mod 4, 19" (483 mm) passive acoustic homing torpedo
 - Electric, 585 lb warhead, range: 4,000 yards @ 19.6 kts
 - Service dates: 1946 – 1960
 - Mk 28 21" 21" (533 mm) passive acoustic homing torpedo
 - Electric, 128 lb warhead, range: 6,200 yards @ 15.9 kts
 - Service dates: 1944 – 1960
- Various WWII-era mines
- No deck guns
 - All removed in an effort to streamline older submarines under the Navy's GUPPY program.

State-of-the-art in 1955

Submarine weaponry

- 1st-generation submarine-launched land attack cruise missiles under development
 - 12 February 1947: First JB-2 Loon missile tested from a submarine, USS Cusk (SS-348)
 - July 1953: First Regulus I launched from a submarine, USS Tunny (SS-282)
- No anti-ship cruise missiles
- Submarine-launched ballistic missile development just starting
 - 9 September 1955: Joint program established to develop the Army's liquid-fuelled Jupiter IRBM for Navy use on submarines & surface ships.



Cusk launches JB-2 Loon

Source: Wikipedia



Tunny launches Regulus I

Source: Wikipedia

State-of-the-art in 1955

Nuclear weapons

- Small atomic weapons existed. W9 warhead for 280 mm “atomic cannon” was tested in 1953.
- Thermonuclear weapons were just being introduced to the military inventory and they were very large:
 - 28 Feb 1954: U.S. detonated its first “deliverable” (non-cryogenic) thermonuclear weapon, Bravo.
 - Mk-17 & Mk-24 bombs were the first operational thermonuclear weapons deployed by the U.S.:
 - 24.7 ft (7.52 m) long, 61.4 in (1.56 m) diameter, and weighed 21 tons (19,091 kg).
 - Yield: 10 – 15 MT
 - In production Oct 54 - Nov 1955
 - Mk-15 bomb was the first relatively lightweight thermonuclear bomb created by the U.S.:
 - 11.7 ft long (3.56 m) long, 35 in (0.89 m) diameter, and weighed 7,600 lb (3,450 kg)
 - Yield: 1.7 – 3.8 MT
 - First produced in 1955



Mk-17

Source: <http://www.castleairmuseum.org>



Mk-15

Source: Wikipedia

State-of-the-art in 1955


Communications

- WW-II-era HF & VHF radio communications were available for vessels on the surface, as was short-range signaling via flags or flashing light.
- The only operational means for communicating with a submerged submarine was the AN/WQC-2, “Gertrude”, underwater telephone developed in 1945.
- Very Low Frequency (VLF) communications were not available
 - VLF radio waves (3 – 30 kHz) can penetrate seawater to a depth of about 20 meters.
 - Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) developed a VLF facsimile transmission system, known as “Bedrock”, that was the first system to provide reliable command and control communication from a single high-power transmitting station in the U.S. to continuously submerged submarines operating in any region of the world.
 - Earliest demonstrations of this system were:
 - USS Skate (SSN-578) used the system successfully on its 1959 voyage to the North Pole.
 - USS Triton (SSN-586) used the system with good results throughout the first submerged circumnavigation of the globe, February-May 1960.
 - VLF communications systems were installed in all nuclear submarines, with communications via a VLF “crossed-loop” antenna and/or a floating wire antenna that trails behind the sub.

State-of-the-art in 1955

Communications

- No TACAMO aircraft to provide a backup VLF data and HF voice radio transmission capability to relay Emergency Action Messages from the President to submarines.
- 1962: 1st TACAMO tests
- 1969: System operationally deployed using EC-130Q Hercules cargo aircraft flying long-duration missions over the Atlantic and Pacific.
- Modern TACAMO aircraft are E-6B.



State-of-the-art in 1955

Communications

- Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) communications not available
 - Project Sanguine was proposed in 1968 to create a hardened ELF transmitter facility in Wisconsin & Michigan to transmit tactical orders one-way to U.S. nuclear subs anywhere in the world, and survive a direct nuclear attack.
 - ELF radio waves can penetrate seawater to a depth of hundreds of feet.
 - Original design would have operated at 76 Hz and required about 800 MW of electric power
 - Project ELF was the scaled-back 76 Hz system actually built in Wisconsin & Michigan.
 - Operational from 1989 to 2004, then retired due to high operating cost and regional ecological opposition.

Submarine radio communications




Image source: adapted from R. Romero and V. Lehtoranta, 22 November 1999.

State-of-the-art in 1955

Communications

- Satellite communications not available

- 4 Oct 1957: 1st satellite, Sputnik 1, launched into orbit
- Aug 1960: Echo 1 launched; the world's 1st communications satellite capable of passively relaying radio signals to other points on Earth.
 - Relayed 1st recorded voice message (from President Eisenhower) on 13 Aug 1960 from CA to NJ
- Jul 1962: Telstar 1 launched; the 1st communications satellite capable of relaying television signals from Europe to North America.
- Early 1970s: Initial Navy operational use of satellite communications during Vietnam War
- 1978-89: Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) system launched; operational 1981
- 1984-90: Leasat launched & leased by Navy to add capacity:
- 1993-2003: Ultra-High Frequency Follow-On (UFO) system launched to replace FLTSATCOM
- 2012: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) 1st launch; provides smart-phone-like service to Navy forces. 4th launch Sep 2015.

State-of-the-art in 1955

Navigation

- Well-established manual navigation available
 - Charts & sightings
 - Sextant, marine chronometer & Nautical Almanac
 - Dead-reckoning
- Long-range HF radio navigation available
 - The long-range radio navigation system LORAN, LONg-range Aid to Navigation, later called LORAN-A, introduced in January 1943, was still the standard system in use in 1955.
 - LORAN-A range up to 1,500 miles, with accuracy of tens of miles
 - LORAN-C became operational along the U.S. east coast in 1957 and the system came under management of the U.S. Coast Guard in August 1958. LORAN-C fixes typically were accurate within hundreds of feet
 - LORAN-C coverage areas included the US coasts, Mediterranean, Norwegian Sea, Central Pacific, and Bearing Sea
 - 3 August 2010: all LORAN transmissions in North America from Canada and the U.S. ceased broadcasting
 - Loran-C was the underpinning of Enhanced Loran, or e-Loran, which some had envisioned as a backup system to satellite-based GPS.

State-of-the-art in 1955

Navigation

- No shipboard inertial navigation system
 - Autonetics Division of North American Aviation conducted the first airplane flight of an inertial Autonavibrator (XN-1) in 1950.
 - The first flight of the all-solid-state Autonetics N6A inertial guidance system developed for the Navajo Navaho supersonic intercontinental cruise missiles occurred in 1955
 - In 1957 – 58, research ship USS Compass Island (AG-153) tested the Navy's first inertial navigation system, N6A-1 Autonavibrator, which was a modification of the N6A.
 - The N6A-1 was installed on Nautilus, Skate and Sargo for their missions to the North Pole.
 - Ships Inertial Navigation System (SINS) originally was developed for the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarine program
 - Developed by Sperry. One of the earliest transistorized systems introduced widely in Navy ships
 - First deployed in 1960 on USS Halibut and for USS Seadragon's Arctic cruise
 - Originally known as the N7, derived from the N6A-1. Re-designated Mk II SINS.
 - Manufactured from late 1950s to 2006
 - Dual Miniature Ships Inertial Navigation System (DMINS)
 - Developed by Rockwell
 - First deployed in Los Angeles-class SSNs in 1976 and retrofit on selected other subs and aircraft carriers

State-of-the-art in 1955


Navigation

- No long-range VLF radio navigation available
 - OMEGA was a global-range radio navigation system, operated by the U.S. and six partner nations, with a set of very low frequency (VLF) fixed terrestrial radio beacons transmitting at 10 to 14 kHz.
 - Became operational in 1971; shut down in 1997 in favor of GPS.
- No satellite navigation system available
 - TRANSIT
 - Development of the TRANSIT system began in 1958.
 - The first successful tests of the system were made in 1960, and the system entered Naval service in 1964.
 - TRANSIT provided continuous navigation satellite service initially for Polaris submarines and later for other military and civilian use.
 - Ceased navigation service in 1996; replaced by GPS.
 - Global Positioning System (GPS)
 - GPS project began in 1973.
 - 1st experimental Block-I GPS satellite was launched in 1978.
 - Achieved full operational capability in April 1995.

State-of-the-art in 1955

Shipboard Computers

- In 1955, no computer small enough to fit through a submarine's hatch existed.
- The 1st standard Navy shipboard computer, AN/UYK-1, was still years away.
 - This was the military designation of the Thompson Ramo Wooldridge TRW-130 computer introduced in 1961.
 - AN/UYK-1 was the processor in the AN/BRN-3 Submarine Navigation Subsystem developed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation (receiver) and TRW for Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarines.
 - AN/UYK-1 integrated TRANSIT satellite navigation and Ships Inertial Navigation System (SINS) data.
 - First installed in an FBM submarine on 31 December 1963, about two years after the start of Polaris submarine deterrent patrols in 1960.




AN/UYK-1 computer
Source: TRW M250-2U19 Rev B Feb 63

Marine nuclear propulsion system basics


PWR propulsion plant basic process flow diagram

The pressurized water reactor is the dominant type of marine reactor today



Source: adapted from World Nuclear Association

How heat transfer in a PWR primary system works



- The primary system is a closed-loop heat transport system that circulates ordinary water to move thermal energy from the reactor core (the heat source) to the steam generators (the heat sink) where the thermal energy is transferred into the secondary coolant to produce steam.
- Intact steam generator tubes prevent leakage of primary coolant into the secondary system.
- The primary coolant returns to the reactor to be reheated and circulated again through the primary system.
- The pressurizer is a “surge volume” with heaters and sprays that are used to maintain the correct high pressure in the PWR primary system and prevent the primary coolant water from boiling in the reactor core.

How heat transfer in a PWR primary system works

- The reactor is the heat exchanger in the closed-loop primary system containing the heat source (the reactor fuel elements).
- The steam generator is the other heat exchanger in the closed-loop primary system containing the heat sink (the secondary coolant flowing through the steam generator tubes).
- The pressurizer maintains the PWR primary system at constant pressure.
- The continuous flow of the sub-cooled water primary coolant transfers heat from the reactor to the steam generators.
- In both heat exchangers, heat transfer in a sub-cooled liquid system at constant pressure is governed by:

$Q = UA \Delta T_m$, where:

Q = rate of heat transfer

U = mean overall heat transfer coefficient


A = heat transfer surface area of the heat exchanger

ΔT_m = logarithmic mean temperature difference across the heat exchanger

How heat transfer in a Rankine-cycle secondary system works


Thermal energy is transferred across the steam generator tubes and boils secondary coolant water to produce steam

Steam turbines expand the steam to extract energy to drive the propulsion machinery and to generate AC electric power via turbine generators



- Turbine exhaust steam is condensed in the main condenser and this water is pumped back to the steam generator where it continues removing heat from the primary system to produce more steam.
- A motor-generator supplies DC loads (i.e., the ship's battery and an emergency DC propulsion motor) and can supply AC loads in an emergency.
- Some subs use electric motors for main propulsion. These subs have large turbine generators and no mechanical propulsion train.

How heat transfer in a Rankine-cycle secondary system works



Timeline

Decade-by-decade

Timeline highlights

2 Dec 42
1st man-made
self-sustaining
nuclear chain reaction,
CP-1 pile

Early 1946
Eight Naval officers,
including Rickover,
detailed to Oak Ridge
for the start of the
Naval Nuclear Program

Feb 49
Rickover assigned to AEC's
Div of Reactor Development
& Dir. Naval Reactors
Branch of BuShips

15 Nov 60
1st U.S. Polaris SSBN
deterrent patrol

25 Nov 61
1st nuclear aircraft carrier,
USS Enterprise
commissioned

10 Jan 63
Dreadnought SSN
1st UK underway on
nuclear power

15 Jun 68
1st UK SSBN
deterrent patrol

Jun 69
1st Russian Yankee SSBN
deterrent patrol

1981
1st Russian Typhoon-class
SSBN commissioned

11 Nov 81
1st U.S. Ohio-class
SSBN commissioned

23 Feb 83
1st French SSN
(Rubis) commissioned

1987
1st Chinese SSBN
(Xia) operational

1988
Russian Charlie SSN
leased by India

23 Oct 04
1st U.S. Virginia-
class SSN
commissioned

7 Feb 06
1st U.S. Ohio-class
SSGN conversion,
re-joins the fleet

2007
300th UK SSBN
deterrent patrol

1940s

1950s

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

2010s

17 Jan 55
USS Nautilus
world's 1st underway
on nuclear power

4 Jun 58
November- class SSN
1st USSR underway
on nuclear power

3 Aug 58
USS Nautilus,
1st vessel to reach North Pole

15 Apr 59
USS Skipjack
1st sub combining Albacore hull &
nuclear power commissioned

15 Sep 59
USSR icebreaker Lenin,
world's 1st nuclear
surface ship voyage

1971
1st French sub
(Le Redoutable SSBN)
commissioned

23 Aug 71
1st Chinese sub
(Han SSN) underway on
nuclear power

31 Dec 71
1st USSR Alfa
SSN commissioned

3 May 1975
1st Nimitz-class
aircraft carrier
commissioned

17 Aug 77
Russian icebreaker
Arktika, 1st surface ship
To reach North Pole

Dec 94
1st UK Vanguard-class
SSBN deterrent patrol

9 Mar 95
Last of original
41 U.S. Polaris subs,
decommissioned

19 Jul 97
1st U.S. Seawolf class
SSN commissioned

1997
1st French Triumphant-class
SSBN deterrent patrol

30 Jul 99
USS S Carolina, last
U.S. nuclear cruiser,
decommissioned.

1 Mar 13
Brazil inaugurates
naval shipyard for
building its 1st nuc sub


2013
Russia commissions
1st new-gen Borei
SSBN & Yasen SSN

2014
1st Chinese
2nd-generation Jin
SSBN operational


19 Sep 14
400th U.S. SSBN
deterrent patrol

16 Dec 14
1st Indian indigenous
nuclear sub, SSBN
INS Arihant sea trials


Marine nuclear power timeline – 1940s




Marine nuclear power timeline – 1950s




Marine nuclear power timeline – 1960s




Marine nuclear power timeline – 1970s




Marine nuclear power timeline – 1980s




Marine nuclear power timeline – 1990s



Marine nuclear power timeline – 2000s



Marine nuclear power timeline – 2010s




Effects of nuclear weapons
and missile treaties &
conventions on the
composition of naval
nuclear fleets

Treaties & conventions

- 1963: Limited Test Ban Treaty (no effect on naval nuclear fleets)
- 1970: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT, aka Non-Proliferation Treaty)
- 1972: Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I)
- 1979: Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II)
- 1987: Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
- 1988: Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
- 1991: GHW Bush Presidential Nuclear Initiatives
- 1994: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)
- 1993: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II, never implemented)
- 2002: International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC, Hague Code of Conduct)
- 2003: Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, aka Treaty of Moscow)
- 2011: New START (formally known as Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms)
- Future: Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)

Timeline




Timeline

A History of Nuclear Arms Control

Tuesday's deal with Iran is the latest in decades-long global effort to curb nuclear weapons development. A look at some major agreements.

Nuclear-weapons stockpiles

- U.S.
- RUSSIA
- OTHERS



● DATE OF FIRST ATOMIC TEST

1945 U.S.

1949 RUSSIA

1952 U.K.

1960 FRANCE

1964 CHINA

1974 INDIA

1998 PAKISTAN

2006 N. KOREA

1963 **Limited Test-Ban Treaty**

First arms pact of the Cold War, restricted nuclear testing to underground trials

1968 **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**

Limited the spread of atomic weapons technology to non-nuclear states

1972 **SALT I/ABM Treaty**

Restricted number of U.S. and Russia's nuclear antimissile interceptors

1987 **Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty**

U.S., Russia cut ground-launched missiles with 300-3,400 mile ranges

1991 **START I**

Limited U.S. and Russia's number of deployed warheads and delivery vehicles.

2002 **SORT**

U.S. and Russia cut strategically deployed warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 each

2010 **New START**

Each side limited to 1,550 deployed warheads, and 700 delivery vehicles

Notes: Test date uncertain for Israel, which neither confirms nor denies having nuclear weapons; South Africa acknowledged having a limited nuclear arsenal, which it disassembled.

Sources: Arms Control Association; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; Federation of American Scientists

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Signatories of NPT & international missile control conventions

Country	NPT	MTCR	ICOC
USA	Signed, weapons state	Member	Subscribing state
Russia	Signed, weapons state	Member	Subscribing state
UK	Signed, weapons state	Member	Subscribing state
France	Signed, weapons state	Member	Subscribing state
China	Signed, weapons state	Non-member, agreed partial compliance	Not subscribing
Germany	Signed, non-weapons state	Member	Subscribing state
Japan	Signed, non-weapons state	Member	Subscribing state
India	Not signed, weapons state	Non-member	Not subscribing
Brazil	Signed, non-weapons state	Member	Not subscribing
Italy	Signed, non-weapons state	Member	Subscribing state
Canada	Signed, non-weapons state	Member	Subscribing state
Australia	Signed, non-weapons state	Member	Subscribing state
North Korea	Withdrew, weapons state	Non-member	Not subscribing
Israel	Not signed, weapons state?	Non-member, agreed partial compliance	Not subscribing
Pakistan	Not signed, weapons state	Non-member	Not subscribing
Iran	Signed, non-weapons state	Non-member	Not subscribing

  Marine nuclear propulsion state

  Interest in marine nuclear propulsion

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

aka Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

- NPT is an international treaty intended to:
 - Limit the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology,
 - Support the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament
 - Recognize the right to peacefully use nuclear technology
- The NPT entered into force on 5 Mar 1970; effective period 25 years.
 - The NPT is reviewed at 5-year intervals in meetings called “Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”
 - On 11 May 1995, a consensus of the Review Conference agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely.
- A total of 191 states joined the NPT with North Korea withdrawing in 2003.
 - Non-signators are India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and South Sudan
- The NPT consists of a preamble and eleven articles.
 - Article IV affirms, “...the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes...”
- Application of the NPT is guided by IAEA document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), June 1972, *The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

aka Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

- The NPT does not explicitly regulate the production, use, and disposition of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for naval nuclear reactors.
 - Paragraph 14 of *INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)*, June 1972 allows a state to withdraw nuclear material from safeguards if it is being used for a “nonproscribed military activity” (i.e., for use in naval reactor fuel), and , “...the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
 - This is viewed by some as a legal loophole in the NPT, which allows fissile material to be removed from IAEA monitoring for use in non-weapons military applications.
 - On 21 Mar 2014, the *New York Times* reported that U.S. naval reactors use about 4,500 pounds (2,041 kg) of HEU per year. Other worldwide naval reactor programs combined use about 1,500 pounds (680 kg) of HEU per year.
 - The *New York Times* article claims that the U.S. has 150 tons (136,078 kg) of weapons-grade uranium set aside for use in naval fuel.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

aka Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

- NPT and the NATO Multilateral Force (MLF)
 - MLF was a U.S. proposal, supported by the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations, to create a NATO fleet of nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and surface warships armed with Polaris missiles.
 - The Italian cruiser *Giuseppe Garibaldi* was the only vessel refitted with four launchers for Polaris missiles
 - The vessels in the fleet would have been manned by NATO crews and under NATO command, thereby increasing European control over their own nuclear defense in the event of a war with the Soviet Union
 - MLF also was seen as a way to preclude independent nuclear weapons development by some European nations.
 - MLF failed in the 1965 – 66 timeframe because the U.S. and the European NATO members could not agree on many key factors that would govern international nuclear collaboration under MLF, including: vessel type (submarine and/or surface ship launch platforms), basing, and financing.
 - The extent of dysfunction within NATO was punctuated on 21 June 1966 by France's withdrawal from NATO.
 - It has been reported that the Soviet Union made elimination of the NATO MLF a pre-condition to their signing the NPT on 1 July 1968. By that date, the MLF no longer was an issue.

Use of HEU in naval reactors is permitted by Paragraph 14 of *INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)*, June 1972

NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED IN NON-PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES

14. The Agreement should provide that if the State intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded thereunder in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under the Agreement, the following procedures will apply:
- (a) The State shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear:
 - (i) That the use of the *nuclear material* in a non-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the State may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the *nuclear material* will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and
 - (ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the *nuclear material* will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
 - (b) The Agency and the State shall make an arrangement so that, only while the *nuclear material* is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in the Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in the Agreement shall again apply as soon as the *nuclear material* is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded *nuclear material* in the State and of any exports of such material; and
 - (c) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. The Agency's agreement shall be given as promptly as possible; it shall only relate to the temporal and procedural provisions, reporting arrangements, etc., but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the *nuclear material* therein.

Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty

(SALT I)

- President Richard Nixon & Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed SALT I 26 May 72. The treaty was ratified by Congress 3 Aug 72
- SALT I was comprised of two major parts
 - Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
 - Allowed one ABM site with 100 ABM launchers
 - U.S. withdrew from ABM treaty 13 Jun 2002
 - Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
 - Set quantitative limits on ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers (higher than either side possessed at the time), but no limit on the number of warheads.
 - Freeze the number of strategic ballistic missiles at 1972 levels
 - Limits included:
 - U.S. could have a maximum of 44 SSBN subs with 710 SLBM launchers; Russia could have a maximum of 62 SSBN subs with 950 SLBM launchers.
 - NATO and the U.S. could operate a maximum of 50 SSBNs with a maximum of 800 SLBM launchers among them
 - U.S had 41 Polaris SSBNs and the UK had 4 SSBNs.
 - France was not a NATO member between 1966 and 2009
 - This part of SALT had a 5 year duration and expired in 1977. It was intended to be superseded by SALT II, which was not ratified.

Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II

(SALT II)

- President Jimmy Carter & Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed SALT II on 18 Jun 1979 by the treaty was not ratified by Congress
- Limits: Each side was limited to 2,400 (dropping to 2,250 in Jan 1981) deployed launchers for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, including ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and air-launched missiles with ranges > 600 km (373 mi)
 - Various ceilings on missiles carrying multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs)
 - Ban until Dec 1981 on deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles with range > 600 km (373 mi)
- While not being ratified, some of the SALT II limits were voluntarily observed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union
- U.S. formally withdrew in 1986

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

- MTCR is an informal and voluntary partnership among member states that originally was created to prevent the proliferation of delivery systems for nuclear weapons; specifically delivery systems capable of carrying a 500 kg (1,102 lb) payload for at least 300 km (186 mi).
 - Applies to ballistic missiles, cruise missile, and other unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
- Established in April 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Great Britain, and the U.S. MTCR functions primarily as an export control group.
 - In 1992, MTCR expanded to apply to all weapons of mass destruction, not just nuclear weapons
 - In 2015 there are 34 member states.
 - Not all members have agreed to the same level of compliance
- The MTCR “no undercut” policy means that if one member denies the sale of some missile technology to another country, then all members must adhere.
- In 2002, the MTCR was supplemented by the *International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation* (Hague Code of Conduct).
- MTCR has been successful in stopping some international missile programs and limiting the export of others.
- However, MCTR has its limitations; India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan continue to advance their indigenous missile programs.
 - Israel’s Popeye Turbo and India’s Nirbhay long-range submarine-launched subsonic cruise missiles
 - The Russia – India BrahMos joint-venture that developed the BrahMos family of medium-range anti-ship supersonic cruise missiles.

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

- President Ronald Reagan & General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the INF treaty on 8 Dec 1987. It was ratified by Congress in May 1988. Entry into force date: 1 Jun 1988
 - Eliminated nuclear and conventional intermediate range (500 – 5,500 km; 311 – 3,418 mi) ground launched ballistic and cruise missiles.
 - Focus was on eliminating all U.S. Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (Gryphon GLCMs) and all Soviet SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 ballistic missiles.
 - INF did not directly affect submarine-launched nuclear weapons. However, it did raise their importance.
 - Nuclear-armed submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missile (TLAM-N, BGM-109A) entered service in 1986, with a range of 2,494 km (1,550 mi).
- Current Issues:
 - Since 2005, Russia repeatedly has reported that it was considering withdrawing from the INF treaty,
 - In July 2014, the U.S. formally notified Russia that it considers them in breach of the treaty for developing and possessing prohibited weapons:
 - The R-500 ground-launched cruise missile and a short-range “ICBM”.
 - Russia argues that similar weapons have been developed by Asian nations that are not constrained by the INF treaty.

Presidential Nuclear Initiatives

- Issued by President George H. W. Bush in September 1991
 - Not a treaty. This was a unilateral action by the U.S.
 - The President ordered the Navy to “withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from it’s surface ships and submarines,” including:
 - Carrier Air Wing aircraft-delivered nuclear weapons
 - Tomahawk nuclear land attack cruise missiles (TLAM-N), which were carried by some Los Angeles-class SSNs and some surface ships.
 - The withdrawal was completed in early 1992.
 - An U.S. aircraft carrier battle group and all U.S. SSNs / SSGNs now have no nuclear weapons.
 - Several Navy tactical nuclear weapons already had been retired:
 - ASTOR (Mark 45) nuclear torpedo retired in 1976
 - SUBROC (UUM-44) anti-sub missile with nuclear depth charge retired in 1989
 - ASROC (RUR-5) surface ship-launched anti-sub nuclear depth charge retired in 1989.
 - Did not affect the strategic submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) carried by the SSBN fleet, which now are the only nuclear weapons in the Navy’s fleet.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

(START 1)

- Signed by President George H. W. Bush & Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on 31 July 1991
- Break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991 contributed to a three year delay between signing the treaty and its entry into force.
 - The Lisbon Protocol, which adapted the original signed treaty to the political situation in the new Russian Federation, was signed on 23 May 1992
 - Four post-Soviet states, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan & Ukraine, were recognized as parties to START I in place of the Soviet Union, but only Russia was designated a nuclear weapon state.
 - Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine assumed an obligation to join the NPT as non-nuclear states and eliminate all START I accountable weapons and associated facilities within 7 years.
- EIF 5 Dec 1994; effective for 15 years; expired 5 Dec 2009; superseded by New START.
- Basic limits:
 - Each side limited to 1,600 operational delivery vehicles, including ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear-capable bombers
 - Maximum of 6,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads + other warhead limits
 - Maximum “throw weight” of 3,600 metric tons.
- Treaty bans testing of missiles with more warheads than established in the treaty, and bans any new ballistic missiles with more than 10 warheads.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II

(START II)

- Signed by President George H. W. Bush and Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin on 3 Jan 1993.
- This treaty never went into effect (entered force):
 - Ratified by the U.S. Senate on 26 January 1996
 - After a long delay, during which the treaty became less relevant, Russia ratified the treaty on 14 April 2000.
 - On 14 June 2002, Russia withdrew from START II in response to U.S. withdrawal from the SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on 13 June 2002.
 - START II was replaced by SORT on 1 June 2003
- Intended limits:
 - Banned use of multiple, independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on ICBMs
 - SLBMs were not affected by START II
- While not done to comply with START II, the U.S. unilaterally deactivated all MIRV'd LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBMs by 2005 and converted all LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBMs to single re-entry vehicle per missile.

International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

(ICOC, Hague Code of Conduct)

- Established on 25 November 2002; today with 119 member countries.
- Calls for restraint and care in the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
 - It is the only normative instrument to verify the spread of ballistic missiles.
- Operates in parallel with Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

(SORT, aka *Treaty of Moscow*)

- Signed by President G.W. Bush & Russian President Vladimir Putin on 24 May 2002 and ratified by the U.S. Senate and Russian Duma; EIF 1 Jun 2003
- Limits:
 - In a key departure from START I, SORT limited operationally deployed warheads, whereas START I limited warheads through declared attribution to their means of delivery (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers).
 - Each side agreed to reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads from 2,200 to 1,700 by 31 December 2012 (the date SORT was scheduled to expire).
- Implementation:
 - Warheads are not required to be destroyed and may therefore be placed in storage and later redeployed.
 - U.S. deactivated all 50 LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBMs by 2005, each of which was equipped with 10 MIRVs. The remaining U.S. fleet of 450 LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBMs were converted from 3 MIRV warheads to a single re-entry vehicle per missile.
 - The U.S. SLBM fleet retained its MIRV warheads, but with fewer than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles per missile.
- Superseded by New START on EIF date: 5 Feb 2011.

New START

- Formally known as *Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*
- Signed by President Barack Obama and Russian President Dimitry Medvedev on 8 April 2010
- EIF 5 Feb 2011; replaces START I and SORT; expires 5 Feb 2021
- Limits applicable to both sides commencing 5 Feb 2018
 - Maximum of 700 deployed (operational) launchers, including ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear-capable bombers
 - Maximum of 800 deployed and non-deployed (nuclear capable) launchers
 - 1,550 (or somewhat more*) deployed strategic nuclear warheads
 - Actual number of re-entry vehicles per missile are counted; one warhead per re-entry vehicle.
 - * Only one warhead is counted per bomber regardless of how many warheads it actually carries. The actual number of free-fall nuclear bombs and/or air-launched cruise missiles can be 16 – 20 per bomber.
- Limits on total deployed + non-deployed launchers are intended to prevent each side from maintaining a stockpile of non-deployed launchers that could be made operational in a relatively short period of time.

Comparison of Treaty Limits


Treaty	START (1991)	Moscow Treaty (2002)	New START (2010)
Limits on Delivery Vehicles	1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles	No limits	800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear weapons Within the 800 limit, 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear weapons
Limits on Warheads	6,000 warheads attributed to ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers 4,900 warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs 1,100 warheads attributed to mobile ICBMs 1,540 warheads attributed to heavy ICBMs	1,700-2,200 deployed strategic warheads No sublimits	1,550 deployed warheads No sublimits
Limits on Throwweight	3,600 metric tons	No limit	No limit

Source: The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, Congressional Research Service, February 2015

New START implementation

- Each side has the flexibility to structure its nuclear forces as it wishes, within the limits of the treaty.
- U.S. actions to reduce its number of operational launchers and deployed warheads include:
 - No later than 5 Feb 2013, the U.S. was required to exhibit four Ohio-class submarines converted permanently from SSBN to SSGN role, eliminating 96 strategic launchers
 - In 2015 the U.S. Navy began reducing the number of missile tubes in Ohio-class SSBNs from 24 to 20. This work will be completed by 5 Feb 2018, eliminating 40 strategic launchers for Trident II (D-5) MIRV'd SLBMs.
 - By 5 Feb 2018, the single-warhead Minuteman III ICBM fleet will be reduced from 450 armed missiles to 400 armed missiles, with 50 unarmed missiles in reserve.
- The treaty does not limit the number of operationally inactive stockpiled nuclear warheads. The Federation of American Scientists has estimated that, as of 1 Mar 2015, the U.S. and Russia have the following inventories.
 - U.S.: 7,100 total warheads; 4,760 in the military stockpile (1,597 deployed, 3,163 inactive stockpile), 2,340 awaiting dismantling
 - Russia: 7,500 total warheads; 4,500 in the military stockpile (1,582 deployed, 2,918 inactive stockpile), 3,000 awaiting dismantling

Progress toward meeting New START limits



Source: <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2015/04/newstart2015/>

New START implementation

- The treaty does not prohibit either side from deploying conventional warheads on strategic missiles.
 - These strategic missiles would be counted against the treaty limits.
 - The treaty cautions that both sides are, “mindful of the impact of conventionally-armed IRBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability.”
 - The U.S. is planning a weapon of this type called Prompt Global Strike (PGS), which is intended to deliver a precision conventional warhead to strike any point in the world within 1 hour of launch.
 - In Feb 2014, the Navy solicited bids for a 2-year industry trade study for a submarine-launched, intermediate-range, hypersonic, conventional warhead PGS weapon.

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

(FMCT)

- FMCT is a proposed international treaty intended to prohibit the production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons-grade plutonium.
 - HEU = enrichment $> 20\%$
 - LEU = enrichment $\leq 20\%$
- Preliminary FMCT discussions have been held by the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), which is a body of 65 member nations established as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament.
- Nations that joined the NPT as non-weapon states already are prohibited from producing or acquiring fissile material for weapons.
- If FMCT is ever passed, it could put at risk the continued use of HEU as naval reactor fuel.
 - Large HEU inventories exist in the U.S., Russia, UK and France
 - Long operating lives of modern HEU naval reactors will make their phase-out difficult.

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)

- According to the International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM) *Global Fissile Material Report 2015*, the global stockpile of HEU is about 1,345 tons.
- IPFM estimates the global stockpile of separated plutonium at about 499 tons.

Fissile Material Production End Dates

Country	Highly-enriched Uranium HEU	Weapons-grade Plutonium
USA	Stopped 1992 (since 1964 for naval fuel only)	Stopped 1988
Russia	Stopped 1989; May have restarted in 2012 for export	Stopped 1994
UK	Stopped 1962 (imports from USA)	Stopped 1995
France	Stopped 1996	Stopped 1992
China	Stopped 1987 (unofficial)	Stopped 1991 (unofficial)
India	Ongoing	Ongoing
Pakistan	Ongoing	Ongoing
Israel	Status unknown	Status unknown
North Korea	Status unknown	Status unknown
Brazil	Claims not to enrich >20%	None

Source: <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/fmct>

Marine reactor fuel enrichments in use in mid-2015

- U.S and UK:
 - The U.S. Navy is known to operate with reactor cores fueled by very highly enriched uranium, either 97% produced specifically for naval reactors, or 93% extracted from surplus nuclear weapons.
 - UK naval reactor fuel uses the same enrichment. UK imports some HEU for naval fuel from the U.S.
- Russia:
 - Russian naval reactors typically use HEU fuel. For example, the most commonly used submarine reactor, the OK-650, uses a fuel enrichment of 20 – 45%.
 - Russia's current-generation Arktika-class icebreakers with OK-900A reactors use HEU fuel enriched to 55 - 90%.
 - Russia's *Sevmorput* ice-breaking cargo ship and the Taimyr-class icebreakers respectively have KLT-40 and KLT-40M nuclear power plants that operate on HEU fuel enriched to 30 – 40%.
 - Russian new civilian marine reactors for the LK-60-class icebreakers (RITM-200 PWR) and a floating nuclear power plant (KLT-40S PWR) are designed to operate with LEU fuel.

Marine reactor fuel enrichments in use in mid-2015

- France:
 - Except for their 1st-generation PWR/SNLE PWRs, which have been retired, all operating French naval reactors have been designed to operate with LEU fuel.
 - The newest reactor for the Barracuda SSN is designed to operate with the same LEU enrichment as commercial nuclear power plants (about 3.5%).
- China
 - Chinese naval reactors are believed to operate with LEU fuel enriched to about 5%.
- India:
 - India's PWR naval reactor prototype operates with HEU fuel enriched to 30%.
 - The fuel enrichment for India's first submarine, *Arihant*, is not known.
- Brazil:
 - Brazil claims it's 2131-R PWR naval reactor will use LEU fuel.

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- **The number of nuclear marine nations will increase.**
 - Brazil is expected to launch its indigenous SSN by about 2023.
 - This will give Brazil's Navy the capability to more effectively patrol that nation's 7,491 km (4,655 mi) coastline and protect national interests in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
 - Brazil's current poor economic condition could delay their indigenous nuclear submarine program.
 - No additional nations are expected to develop their own nuclear submarine or surface vessel within the next 5 – 10 years.
 - Iran and North Korea may have the political motivation to develop a global reach, but are unlikely to be capable of deploying an indigenous nuclear submarine in the next decade.

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- The number of nuclear marine nations will increase (continued).
 - Based on the precedent of leasing SSNs to India, the possibility exists that Russia will lease a nuclear submarine to one or more other nations that previously had no nuclear fleet.
 - Successful demonstration of the Russian floating nuclear power plant, *Akademik Lomonosov*, later in this decade should lead to international orders from other nations for similar floating nuclear power plants.

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- **The number of nuclear marine vessels in the worldwide nuclear fleet will increase.**
- 2030 will be an important milestone year because it is near the date when several major submarine classes are scheduled to retire:
 - U.S. Ohio-class SSBNs & SSGNs, Russian Delta IV SSBNs, and UK Vanguard SSBNs all will be retiring near 2030.
 - The investment needed to replace these weapons systems will put a strain on other naval nuclear new construction budgets.
- **The U.S. fleet will get smaller.**
 - There will be about 41 SSNs by 2028, Ohio-class SSBNs & SSGNs will start retiring near that date, and the Ohio-replacement SSBN will not enter service until about 2031. Aircraft carriers will hold steady at 11.
 - U.S. nuclear fleet size could decline by about 15 subs to a total of 69 vessels by 2030.

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- **The number of nuclear marine vessels in the worldwide nuclear fleet will increase (continued).**
- The Russian fleet will start growing back slowly after two decades of under-funding.
 - New-build multi-purpose Yasen-M SSNs, Borei II SSBNs and modernized Sierra and Akula SSNs and Oscar SSGNs will strengthen and expand the submarine force.
 - LK-60 icebreakers will allow retirement of the oldest nuclear icebreakers and may slightly expand the polar icebreaker fleet.
 - Modernization of two or more Kirov-class CGNs should be completed by 2020, complemented by new-construction Leader-class nuclear-powered destroyers that may start entering the fleet in the mid-2020s.
 - Deployment of additional floating nuclear power plants in remote Arctic ports is likely.
 - Russian nuclear fleet size could grow by 5 – 10 vessels to a total of 62 – 67 by 2030.

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- The number of nuclear marine vessels in the worldwide nuclear fleet will increase (continued).
 - The UK nuclear submarine fleet size will be constant.
 - Astute SSNs will replace Trafalger SSNs on a one-for-one basis.
 - Successor SSBNs will replace Vanguard SSBNs on a one-for-one basis.
 - The number of SLBMs and warheads in the SSBN fleet will continue to decrease as a result of the UK's 2010 Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR).
 - The French nuclear vessel fleet size will be constant.
 - Barracuda SSNs will replace Rubis SSNs on a one-for-one basis
 - Le Triomphant-class SSBNs will remain operational beyond 2030, but a program to develop the replacement SSBN will have to start in the early 2020s.

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- The number of nuclear marine vessels in the worldwide nuclear fleet will increase (continued).
- China's nuclear vessel fleet size will grow:
 - Improved Type 93 and multi-mission Type 95 SSNs will be added to the fleet
 - Type 94 and new Type 96 SSBNs will be added to the fleet
 - Next-generation subs will be under construction before 2020s
 - The earliest Type 91 SSNs and the one Type 92 SSBN will be retired
 - The intent to build a nuclear powered aircraft carrier has been raised by China, but deployment within the next 10 – 15 years is very unlikely because of the lead time to design and construct a CVN.
 - China could add 20 or more nuclear submarines to its fleet by 2030 (at a new-build rate of about two per year minus retirements)

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- The number of nuclear marine vessels in the worldwide nuclear fleet will increase (continued).
 - India's nuclear fleet will grow:
 - India will continue construction of its indigenous SSBN fleet to strengthen its national nuclear deterrent force.
 - India will lease additional SSNs from Russia, perhaps even a current-generation Yasen-class SSN.
 - By 2030, India could add seven or more nuclear submarines to its fleet (at an assumed rate of one per two years)
 - Brazil will have one or more indigenous SSNs by 2030.
 - Current plans are for the first SSN to enter the fleet in 2023.
 - The 2010 Joint Plan for Marine Equipment of Brazil calls for six SSNs by 2034.
 - By 2030, Brazil could have three or more indigenous SSNs (at an assumed rate of one per three years), but this will be highly dependent on the state of Brazil's currently-weak economy.

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- The number of nuclear marine vessels in the worldwide nuclear fleet will increase (continued).
- The worldwide nuclear fleet could grow to 189 – 194 vessels by 2030.
 - Most of the real growth will be attributable to the newer nuclear marine nations: China, India & Brazil.
 - The older nuclear marine nations, U.S., Russia, UK & France, will be making major investments to replace or extend the operating lives of aging submarines and surface ships. Being able to replace older vessels, even on a one-for-one basis, will be a significant economic challenge.

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- The ability to operate underwater at high speed for long durations is no longer the sole domain of the nuclear-powered submarine.
 - Nuclear submarines and naval surface forces will be increasingly challenged by the latest generation of non-nuclear submarines using various types of air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems.
 - A well-equipped modern “conventional” submarine has the ability to operate effectively, and silently, at relatively long range against all adversary forces.
 - Armament is comparable to SSNs and SSGNs operated by the U.S. or Russia.

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- The “attack submarine” has evolved into a multi-purpose platform capable of a wide variety of missions
 - The newest generation of SSNs has blurred the distinction between SSNs and SSGNs by carrying a large arsenal of missiles in vertical launch system (VLS) tubes, while retaining the weaponry in the traditional torpedo room. Examples are:
 - U.S. Virginia-class Block V SSNs
 - Russian Yasen / Yasen-M-class SSNs
 - Chinese improved Type 93G SSNs
 - The ability for submarines to host, deploy and recover special operations forces (SOF) and their equipment has become commonplace.
 - The use of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) launched from submarines is increasing and will greatly expand the capabilities of submarines equipped to use them.
 - UUVs will be a “force multiplier”

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- Many nations now have the capability to raise a significant anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenge to U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and their battle groups, or to any other surface fleet.
 - Examples of A2/AD weaponry include:
 - Chinese DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles with a range of 900 miles (1,448 km)
 - Long-range, high-speed, anti-ship cruise missiles, like India's Brahmos Mach 3 cruise missile with a range of 180 mi (290 km), or Russia's similar P-800 Oniks.
 - Some individual submarines can salvo-launch a very large quantity of cruise missiles that may be able to overwhelm the defense capabilities of a carrier battle group.
 - Russian Oscar SSGNs currently carry 24 x P-700 Granit (SS-N-19) and soon will be modified to carry 72 x P-800 (SS-N-26) Oniks.
 - Russian Yasen SSN can carry 24 x P-800 Oniks, or a larger number of smaller missiles.

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- **Prospects for new commercial nuclear marine propulsion applications remains uncertain.**
 - Other than new Russian icebreakers and floating nuclear power plants, it is unlikely that any nation or firm will develop and license a nuclear-powered commercial vessel before 2030.
 - Lloyd's Register updated its 'rules' for nuclear ships, which concern the integration of a reactor certified by a land-based regulator with the rest of the ship.
 - Lloyd's claims this was done in response to its members' interest in commercial marine nuclear propulsion.
 - Interest is driven primarily by market-based measures for controlling carbon dioxide emissions from maritime operations.

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- **Prospects for new commercial nuclear marine propulsion applications remains uncertain (continued).**
- Practical considerations may limit the primary market for new commercial nuclear-powered ships to point-to-point heavy cargo ships, or single port heavy tugs.
 - These applications minimize the number of different national nuclear regulatory organizations that need to be involved in licensing and providing nuclear safety / operational oversight of commercial nuclear marine activities.
 - It also minimizes the investment in nuclear power port infrastructure needed to support a commercial nuclear vessel.
 - Few nations have the in-place regulatory and nuclear service infrastructure needed to support the operation of a commercial nuclear-powered vessel.
 - Developing that infrastructure at the ports of interest could take a decade or more and require significant investment.

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- **The role of nuclear vessels in the Arctic will increase, and most of them will be Russian vessels.**
 - Russia's nuclear-powered polar icebreaker fleet and soon-to-be-deployed floating nuclear power plant give that nation unmatched capabilities to explore and commercialize the Arctic by:
 - Establishing reliable open sea lanes for other vessels in ice-covered regions along the Northern Sea Route
 - Enabling the exploration for, and exploitation of, petroleum, mineral and natural resources along the Russian Arctic coast and in off-shore waters.
 - If Russia's 2015 Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) claim is upheld by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Russia will have the resources and the means to enforce its expanded exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
 - No other Arctic nation has comparable means to operate in the Arctic region.
 - The general decline of the U.S. and Canadian conventional icebreaker fleets opens great opportunities for Russia to dominate the Arctic region.

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- **The role of nuclear vessels in the Arctic will increase, and most of them will be Russian vessels (continued).**
 - Nuclear submarines will continue to have greater freedom of navigation in the Arctic than any other class of vessel.
 - Russia's large number of small, deep-diving, nuclear-powered submarines and associated "motherships" gives them unique capabilities for underwater exploration and other activities in the Arctic and worldwide.
- **Progress will be made in cleaning up radioactive contamination in the Arctic**
 - Continued political pressure, plus economic incentives related to Arctic resource development in the region, will encourage Russia to remediate marine some nuclear waste sites and sunken nuclear submarine sites in the Kara Sea and the Barents Sea.

Prospects for 2015 - 2030

- **Retired naval nuclear vessel decontamination and processing will improve:**
 - The UK must resolve the current nuclear regulatory impasse that is preventing the de-fueling of some retired subs and the decontamination and scrapping of others that have been de-fueled.
 - New facilities near Vladivostok, in the Russian Far East, will enable a more effective decontamination and decommissioning processing of retired Pacific Fleet nuclear vessels and will provide for storage of sealed reactor compartments on land.
 - U.S. is modernizing the Expanded Core Facility at the Idaho National Lab, and will be moving all spent fuel into dry storage.
- **Increasing international pressure for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) could have an impact in the long-term on use of HEU in naval reactors.**
 - Only the U.S. and the UK continue to use HEU enriched to $\geq 93\%$ U-235, and would be most impacted by an FMCT.